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21. Introduction
The purpose of the present paper is three-fold: (i) To show that
universal systematic judgment aggregation can be studied by means of
Boolean algebras. (ii) To show that the concept of an (ultra)filter arises
naturally when describing systematic judgment aggregators through Boolean
algebras, and thus to explain the effectiveness of the (ultra)filter methodology
in abstract aggregation theory. (iii) To give concise algebraic proofs of
dictatorial and oligarchic impossibility theorems in judgment aggregation.
The thrust of this paper is the second aspect which suggests a new
perspective on the (ultra)filter method.
The use of filters and ultrafilters has been firmly established in the theory
of preference aggregation. Fishburn [8] was the first to apply the ultrafilter
concept to prove a possibility theorem for preference aggregation on infinite
electorates, and Kirman and Sondermann [13] employed the ultrafilter
concept to prove that Arrow’s rationality axioms1 imply dictatorship for
finite electorates. Slightly later, Hansson [11] and Brown [3] realized that
the concept of a filter can be used to characterize oligarchies.2 This so-called
(ultra)filter methodology can be summarized as follows: In order to prove
impossibility theorems for finite electorates, one shows, using rationality
axioms on the aggregation function, that the set of all decisive coalitions
must be an ultrafilter (filter, respectively) on the power-set of the electorate.
If the electorate is finite, one can then deduce that this set of coalitions must
be the set of all coalitions containing one and the same element (one and the
same subset, repectively), viz. the dictator (set of oligarchs, respectively).
During the past two years, the (ultra)filter method has also been
applied in the theory of judgment aggregation (i.e. aggregation of logical
propositions): Eckert and Klamler [7] employ ultrafilters to prove a
simple dictatorial impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation due to
Nehring and Puppe [17], and Dietrich and Mongin [5] prove more general
impossibility results for judgment aggregation, of both oligarchic and
dictatorial kind, by means of (ultra)filters.
The success of the (ultra)filter method in social choice theory has often
been simply attributed to the fact that filters and ultrafilters possess,
apparently by some mathematical coincidence, exactly those set-theoretic
closure properties that are also desirable in the investigation of economic
aggregation problems. A notable exception is an article by Lauwers and
Van Liedekerke [14] which shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between ultraproducts3 of preference relations on a given set of alternatives
and preference aggregation functions.
1By “Arrovian rationality axioms” we mean the following four conditions: at least
three alternatives; universality; unanimity preservation (Pareto principle); independence
of irrelevant alternatives.
2Monjardet [16] has argued that Guilbaud’s analysis of collective decision making [9]
(English translation in [10]), which appeared around the time of Arrow’s classic Social
Choice and Individual Values, implicitly uses the notion of an ultrafilter.
3An ultraproduct is a model-theoretic construction, obtained from a — finite or
infinite — sequence of structures of the same type, based on an ultrafilter on the index
set of the sequence.
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However, one can give a more fundamental explanation for the link
between abstract aggregation theory and (ultra)filters: On the one hand, the
concept of a Boolean algebra is a natural mathematical notion for formalizing
abstract aggregation theory as it provides a unified framework to capture
both the algebraic structure of the electorate and the algebraic structure of
the set of truth values. On the other hand, (ultra)filters occur naturally in the
context of Boolean algebras because homomorphisms of Boolean algebras are
typically classified via the pre-image of the 1-element of the image algebra,
called shell, and shells of (2-valued) Boolean algebra homomorphisms are
nothing else than (ultra)filters.
In light of this, it is reasonable to ask whether judgment aggregators
can, at least under some rationality assumptions, be conceived of as Boolean
algebra homomorphisms and, if so, whether such a representation allows for
an economic interpretation of the shell of a homomorphism induced by a
judgment aggregator.
For sufficiently rich agendas, the answer to both questions turns out to
be affirmative.
Assuming universality, systematicity, and an agenda richness condition,
we show through Theorem 3;
• Consistent and complete judgment aggregators correspond to 2-
valued Boolean algebra homomorphisms defined on the power-set
algebra of the electorate.
• The shell of any such homomorphism is just the set of all winning
coalitions (i.e. those coalitions which win the collective outcome for
some proposition and some profile).
• Hence the set of all winning coalitions is an ultrafilter if
the judgment aggregator is consistent, complete, universal and
systematic.
Theorem 6 generalizes this result. Again assuming universality,
systematicity, and an agenda richness condition:
• Non-trivial deductively closed judgment aggregators correspond to
Boolean algebra homomorphisms defined on the power-set algebra
of the electorate.
• The shell of every such homomorphism equals the set of all winning
coalitions.
• Hence the set of all winning coalitions is a filter if the
judgment aggregator is non-trivial, deductively closed, universal
and systematic.
Under the additional assumption of a finite electorate, we obtain a
dictatorial impossibility theorem for certain complete systematic judgment
aggregators and an oligarchic impossibility theorem for certain deductively
closed systematic aggregators. These impossibility theorems are among the
most general versions of Arrow’s theorem to this day, and are slight variations
of results by Dietrich and List [4] and Dietrich and Mongin [5]. The algebraic
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methodology of this paper allows us to give remarkably short proofs of these
results.4
The paper presents the framework in Section 2 and Section 3. Thereafter,
one section each is devoted to the axioms on judgment aggregators, the
results, the proofs, and a conclusion. Technical footnotes make this article
self-contained.
2. Judgment sets
Let X be a set of sentences in propositional logic, called the agenda. We
assume that X is the union of proposition-negation pairs (i.e. there exists
a non-empty set X ′ of sentences such that X =
⋃
p∈X′ {p,¬p}). For every
p ∈ X we denote by ∼p an element q of X such that either q = ¬p or p = ¬q.
Subsets of X will be called judgment sets, and we denote the power-set
of X by P(X).
Let Σ be a consistent set of sentences in propositional logic.5
For every judgment set Y :
(1) Y is Σ-consistent if and only if Σ∪Y 6` (p∧¬p) for any sentence p.
(2) Y is Σ-deductively closed (in X) if and only if for all p ∈ X, if
Σ ∪ Y ` p, then p ∈ Y .
(3) Y is complete (in X) if and only if for all p ∈ X, p 6∈ Y implies
∼p ∈ Y .
(4) Y is algebraically consistent if and only if for all p ∈ X, ∼p ∈ Y
implies p 6∈ Y .
Clearly, every Σ-consistent set is algebraically consistent. The converse is
true if the elements of Σ ∪ X ′ consist of pairwise different propositional
variables, hence the name algebraic, as opposed to logical, consistency.
We assume that for every p ∈ X, {p} is Σ-consistent. Let us introduce
the following abbreviations:
(1) D denotes the set of all Σ-consistent and complete subsets of X.
(2) D∗ denotes the set of all Σ-consistent and Σ-deductively closed
subsets of X.
4After dissemination of the present paper, Bernard Monjardet informed the author
that a similar Boolean view of aggregation can also be found in some of the literature on
preference aggregation (cf. Aleskerov [1] or Kim and Roush [12]).
5Many authors of the judgment-aggregation literature formulate their results with
respect to a general monotonic logic L instead of propositional logic. In order to translate
our framework into theirs, we have to assume that X is a set of L-formulae, where L
is a language whose symbols include the connectives ¬ and ∧ (other truth-functional
connectives are defined as usual in terms of ¬ and ∧). We need to require, in addition,
that a formal provability relation ` is defined for sets of L-formulae, and assume that the
system of consistent subsets induced by ` has the following properties:
(1) {p,¬p} is inconsistent for every L-formula p;
(2) subsets of consistent sets are consistent (monotonicity);
(3) ∅ is consistent, and every consistent set has a consistent superset containing
an element of each pair-set {p,¬p} ;
(4) for all L-formulae p, q, {p, q} ` p ∧ q as well as both p ∧ q ` p and p ∧ q ` q.
Note that in this framework, Σ can simply be added to the axioms of the deductive
system given by `. Hence, if one adopts this general framework, Σ is redundant and
may be deleted — or replaced by ∅ — wherever it occurs in the following. (I owe the
formulation of this footnote to Professor Franz Dietrich.)
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(3) D′ denotes the set of all Σ-deductively closed subsets of X.
(4) Dac denotes the set of all algebraically consistent and complete
subsets of X.
(5) Da denotes the set of all algebraically consistent subsets of X.
A subset Y ⊆ X is ∈ Dac if and only if for all p ∈ X,
p 6∈ Y ⇔ ∼p ∈ Y.
Clearly D ⊆ D∗ ⊆ D′, and D ⊆ Dac ⊆ Da.
We shall often suppress the specification “Σ”; we shall write ‘consistent’
instead of ‘Σ-consistent’ and ‘deductively closed’ instead of ‘Σ-deductively
closed’
3. Judgment aggregators and coalitions
Consider a non-empty (finite or infinite) set N , called the electorate
(committee/population) set. The elements of N will be referred to as
individuals, and subsets of N will be called coalitions. We denote the power-
set of N by P(N).
Consider some map f : Df → P(X) with ∅ 6= Df ⊆ (D′)N , called
judgment aggregator. Elements of the domain Df of f will be referred to as
profiles, the components of every profile will be called individual judgment
sets, whereas the elements of the range of f will be called collective judgment
sets.
f is called complete (or consistent, or deductively closed, or algebraically
consistent, respectively) if its range only consists of complete (or consistent,
or deductively closed, or algebraically consistent, respectively) judgment
sets.6
There are two kinds of impossibility theorems: dictatorial and oligarchic
ones. f will be called dictatorial if and only if there exists some if ∈ N such
that f(A) = Aif for all A ∈ Df . f will be called oligarchic if and only if
there exists some non-empty Mf ⊆ N such that f(A) =
⋂
i∈Mf Ai for all
A ∈ Df .
Next, we introduce some terminology and notation for the description of
coalitions. For all p ∈ X and A = 〈Ai〉i∈N ∈ Df , the coalition
A(p) := {i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}
is called the coalition supporting p given A. We say that A(p) is winning for
p given A under f if and only if p ∈ f(A).
We collect all winning coalitions7 in the set
Ff := {A(p) : A ∈ Df , p ∈ f(A)} ,
6In the first part of Theorem 6, we shall only assume that f is deductively closed,
hence we do not have to assume completeness or consistency at the collective level. A
similar framework has been suggested by Dietrich and List [4]. The consistency of the
collective judgment sets will follow from other properties of the judgment aggregators
under consideration.
7 The set of winning coalitions for p is the same for each profile if and only if f is
independent, i.e. for every p ∈ X and A,A′ ∈ Df ,
A(p) = A′(p)⇒ (p ∈ f(A)⇔ p ∈ f(A′)) .
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and we say that two coalitions C,C ′ ⊆ N are said to share the same part
of a winning coalition (denoted C ∼f C ′) if and only if there exists some
U ∈ Ff such that
C ∩ U = C ′ ∩ U.
These two concepts — winning coalition and sharing the same part of a
winning coalition — will be useful in the algebraic description of systematic
judgment aggregators.
Finally, we adopt the following convention as a notational device: For
all A ∈ Df , we regard f(A) as a function f(A) : X → {0, 1}, defined via
f(A)(p) =
{
1, p ∈ f(A)
0, p 6∈ f(A)
4. Axioms
Consider the following axioms, which are inspired by Arrow’s rationality
axioms:
• A1. Finite electorate. N is finite.
• A2. Agenda richness. There are propositions p, q ∈ X such that
each of the propositions p∧q,¬p∧q, p∧¬q is Σ-consistent and ∈ X.
• A3. Universality. Df ⊇ DN .
• A4. Non-triviality. f is neither constantly = ∅ nor constantly
= X.
• A5. Systematicity. For all p, q ∈ X and A,A′ ∈ Df : If A(p) =
A′(q), then
p ∈ f(A)⇔ q ∈ f(A′).
The axiom of non-triviality, which to the knowledge of the author is new
in the judgment-aggregation literature, is satisfied in two important special
cases:
Remark 1. (1) Suppose f satisfies (A3) as well as the axiom of
strict unanimity preservation, i.e. for all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df , if
A(p) = N then p ∈ f(A) and if A(p) = ∅ then p 6∈ f(A). Then f
satisfies (A4).
(2) Since ∅ is not a complete subset and X not a consistent subset of
X, one has ∅ 6∈ D and X 6∈ D. Therefore, (A4) is satisfied if f is
both complete and consistent.
Proof. (1) Since X is the union of proposition-negation pair-sets,
it must contain some consistent proposition p and some proposition
q which is not universally valid. Hence there must be some A ∈ DN
with A(p) = N and some A′ ∈ DN with A′(q) = ∅. If f satisfies
both (A3) and strict unanimity preservation, then p ∈ f(A) and
q 6∈ f(A′).
(2) ∅ is incomplete, and X is inconsistent (being the union of
proposition-negation pair-sets). So, if f is both complete and
consistent, then f(A) 6= ∅ and f(A) 6= X for all A ∈ Df .

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The axiom of systematicity clearly implies the axiom of independence.8
Actually, systematicity is even equivalent to independence if the agenda
satisfies an additional condition known as total blockedness (cf. e.g. Eckert
and Klamler [7]). Intuitively, an agenda is totally blocked if “any proposition
in the agenda can be reached from any other proposition in it via a sequence
of conditional entailments” (List and Puppe [15]), in other words, if one can
deduce “any position on any issue from any position on any issue, via a chain
of deductions” (Dokow and Holzman [6]).
The agenda richness axiom is inspired by the ultrafilter proof of Lauwers
and Van Liedekerke [14].
5. Results
Recall that
〈
P(N),∩,∪, {,∅, N〉 (wherein {B := N \ B for all B ⊆ N)
and 〈{0, 1},∧,∨,∗ , 0, 1〉 (wherein 0∗ = 1, 1∗ = 0), are Boolean algebras.9
We write 2 for {0, 1}. We will show that non-trivial universal systematic
judgment aggregators are derived from Boolean algebra homomorphisms10
with domain P(N) and vice versa. The shell11 of these homomorphisms will
be just the set of winning coalitions.
Lemma 2. If f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5), then the map
pi : P(N)→ 2, A(p) 7→ f(A)(p)
is well-defined. If, in addition, f is deductively closed, then pi−1{1} equals
Ff and is both ⊇-closed and ∩-closed.12
8See Footnote 7 on page 5.
9〈B,∧,∨,∗ , 0B , 1B〉 is called a Boolean algebra if and only if ∧ and ∨ are associative
and commutative operations on a non-empty set B satisfying both
∀x, y ∈ B (x ∨ y) ∧ y = (x ∧ y) ∨ y = y
and the distributivity axiom
∀x, y, z ∈ B (x ∨ y) ∧ z = (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z),
and for all x ∈ B, the element x∗ ∈ B satisfies
x ∧ x∗ = 0B , x ∨ x∗ = 1B .
Every Boolean algebra can be endowed with an antisymmetric, reflexive and transitive
ordering by defining
x ≤ y :⇔ x ∧ y = x
for all x, y ∈ B. For a primer of Boolean algebras and their use in logic, cf. e.g. Bell and
Slomson [2, Chapter 1].
10A Boolean algebra homomorphism, for short: homorphism, is a map ρ : B1 →
B2 between two Boolean algebras 〈B1,∧1,∨1,∗ , 01, 11〉 and
〈
B2,∧2,∨2,− , 02, 12
〉
which
preserves all three Boolean operations, i.e.
ρ (x ∧1 y) = ρ (x) ∧2 ρ (y) , ρ (x ∨1 y) = ρ (x) ∨2 ρ (y) , ρ (x∗) = ρ (x)−
for all x, y ∈ B1.
11The shell of a Boolean algebra homomorphism ρ : B1 → B2 is defined as ρ−1{12}.
12In other words, if C,C′ ∈ Ff and C′′ ⊇ C, then both C ∩ C′ ∈ Ff and C′′ ∈ Ff .
A non-empty subset G of P(N) that is both ⊇-closed and ∩-closed is sometimes already
called filter. However, we use the word filter in the sense of proper filter and require in
addition that G 6= P(N).
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Note that pi does not have to be a lattice homomorphism13 (let alone a
Boolean algebra homomorphism) in general: pi need not preserve joins, since
the union of two coalitions C,C ′ which are not winning (i.e. C,C ′ ∈ pi−1{0})
can nevertheless be a winning coalition (i.e. C ∪ C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}).14
Our first result is that complete Σ-consistent non-trivial systematic
judgment aggregators correspond to 2-valued Boolean algebra
homomorphisms, and that every such homomorphism yields a complete
algebraically consistent systematic judgment aggregator.
Theorem 3. (1) If f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5) and is both
consistent and complete, then f also satisfies (A4) and pi is a
homomorphism with shell Ff .
(2) Conversely, if ρ : P(N) → 2 is a homomorphism and (A2) is
satisfied, then the judgment aggregator
f : DN → P(X), A 7→ {p ∈ X : ρ (A(p)) = 1}
satisfies (A2-A5) and is both algebraically consistent and complete.
Corollary 4. If f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5) and is both consistent
and complete, then Ff is an ultrafilter.15 If, in addition, (A1) holds, then f
is dictatorial.
In the following we mean by a congruence relation an equivalence relation
which respects the Boolean operations.16 Recall that two coalitions C,C ′
stand in relation ∼f to each other if and only if they share the same part of
some winning coalition.
Lemma 5. If f satisfies axioms (A2-A5) and is deductively closed, then
∼f is a congruence relation on the Boolean algebra P(N) and the Boolean
operations on P(N) induce a Boolean algebra structure on P(N)/ ∼f .
Theorem 3 can be generalized as follows:
Theorem 6. (1) If f satisfies (A2-A5) and is deductively closed,
then the canonical surjection σ : P(N) → P(N)/ ∼f is a
homomorphism with shell Ff .
(2) Conversely, if τ : P(N)→ B is a homomorphism for some Boolean
algebra B and (A2) is satisfied, then the judgment aggregator
f : DN → P(X), A 7→ {p ∈ X : τ (A(p)) = 1B} ,
satisfies (A2-A5) and is algebraically consistent.
13A lattice homomorphism is a map between two lattices, e.g. Boolean algebras, which
preserves meets and joins.
14Consider, for example, an oligarchic f and let C be a proper subset of the set Mf
of oligarchs and let C′ = Mf \ C. Then, C,C′ ∈ pi−1{0} albeit C ∪ C′ = Mf ∈ pi−1{1}.
15A non-empty set G ⊆ P(N) is called a filter on N if and only if G 6= P(N) and G is
both ⊇-closed and ∩-closed. A filter is called an ultrafilter if and only if for all C ⊆ N ,
either C ∈ G or N \ C ∈ G.
16More formally, a binary relation ∼C on a Boolean algebra is a congruence relation
if and only if ∼C is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and for all x, y, x′, y′ such that
both x ∼C x′ and y ∼C y′, one has
x ∧ y ∼C x′ ∧ y′, x ∨ y ∼C x′ ∨ y′, x∗ ∼C (x′)∗.
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Corollary 7. If f satisfies axioms (A2-A5) and is deductively closed,
then Ff is a filter. If, in addition, (A1) holds, then f is oligarchic.
6. Concise algebraic proofs
Remark 8. Let κ be finite or infinite. Let N =
⋃
j∈κCj be a disjoint
decomposition of N and let 〈Yj〉j∈κ be a family of Σ-consistent subsets of X.
Then, each Yj can be extended to a Σ-consistent and complete subset Zj of
X. Thus, there exists some profile A ∈ DN such that Ai = Zj ⊇ Yj for every
i ∈ Cj and j ∈ κ.
Remark 9. If (A2) is satisfied, then
{
A(p) : A ∈ DN , p ∈ X} =
P(N).
Proof. Due to (A2), X contains a sentence p such that both {p} and
{¬p} are Σ-consistent.17 Consider now an arbitrary coalition C. Remark 8
provides a profile A ∈ DN such that for all i ∈ N , if i ∈ C then p ∈ Ai and
if i ∈ N \ C then ¬p ∈ Ai, hence p 6∈ Ai whenever i ∈ N \ C since Ai is
consistent. Therefore,
p ∈ Ai ⇔ i ∈ C
for every i ∈ N . Hence A(p) = C. So, every coalition C is of the form A(p)
for some A ∈ DN and p ∈ X. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose f satisfies (A2), (A3) and (A5). By
(A5), pi is well-defined on Dpi := {A(p) : A ∈ Df , p ∈ X}. Since Df ⊇
DN by (A3), we actually have Dpi ⊇
{
A(p) : A ∈ DN , p ∈ X}, hence
Dpi = P(N) by Remark 9.
Since
f(A)(p) = 1⇔ p ∈ f(A)
for all p ∈ X and A ∈ Df , it is clear that pi−1{1} = Ff . Next, we shall prove
that pi−1{1} is closed under supersets and intersections. For the following,
let p, q denote the two sentences whose existence was postulated in (A2).
pi−1{1} is ⊇-closed. Let C ′ ∈ pi−1{1} and C ⊇ C ′. By (A2) and
Remark 8 there exists a profile A ∈ DN such that
∀i ∈ C \C ′ p∧¬q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ N \C ¬p∧ q ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ C ′ p∧ q ∈ Ai.
Then A(p ∧ q) = C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}, whence p ∧ q ∈ f(A) because pi is well-
defined. However, f(A) is deductively closed, therefore p ∈ f(A), hence
pi−1{1} 3 A(p) = (C \ C ′) ∪ C ′ = C.
pi−1{1} is ∩-closed. Let C ′, C ′′ ∈ pi−1{1}. By (A2) and Remark 8 there
exists a profile A′ ∈ DN such that
∀i ∈ C ′′\C ′ p∧¬q ∈ A′i, ∀i ∈ N\C ′′ ¬p∧q ∈ A′i, ∀i ∈ C ′∩C ′′ p∧q ∈ A′i.
Then A′(p) = (C ′ ∩ C ′′) ∪ (C ′′ \ C ′) = C ′′ ∈ pi−1{1}, so p ∈ f(A′) since
pi is well-defined. On the other hand, A′(q) = (C ′ ∩ C ′′) ∪ (N \ C ′′) ⊇
(C ′ ∩ C ′′) ∪ (C ′ \ C ′′) = C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}. Hence, A′(q) ∈ pi−1{1} because we
have already seen that pi−1{1} is ⊇-closed. Again, since pi is well-defined,
A′(q) ∈ pi−1{1} implies q ∈ f(A′). So, p, q ∈ f(A′), whence p ∧ q ∈ f(A′)
17Such a sentence is also called Σ-contingent.
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because f(A′) is deductively closed and p∧ q ∈ X. It follows that pi−1{1} 3
A′(p ∧ q) = C ′ ∩ C ′′. 
Proof of Theorem 3. First, suppose that f satisfies (A2), (A3) and
(A5) and is consistent and complete. Then Remark 1 teaches that (A4) is
satisfied. Also, Lemma 2 already affirms that pi−1{1} = Ff . For the first part
of the Theorem, it remains to verify that pi preserves algebraic operations.
pi preserves meets. Let C,C ′ ⊆ N . Since pi−1{1} is both ⊇-closed and
∩-closed, we have that
C ∩ C ′ ∈ pi−1{1} ⇔ (C ∈ pi−1{1}, C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}) .
Because pi is {0, 1}-valued, we deduce
pi
(
C ∩ C ′) = 1⇔ (pi(C) = 1, pi(C ′) = 1)⇔ pi(C) ∧ pi(C ′) = 1
and thus
pi
(
C ∩ C ′) = pi(C) ∧ pi(C ′).
pi preserves complements. Let A ∈ DN and p ∈ X. For every i ∈ N , the
set Ai is consistent and complete, hence
p ∈ Ai ⇔ ∼p 6∈ Ai,
so A(p) = N \A(∼p) = {A(∼p), or equivalently
(1) {A(p) = A(∼p).
On the other hand, f(A) is consistent and complete, therefore ∼p ∈ f(A) if
and only if p 6∈ f(A). Hence, we finally obtain
pi
(
{A(p)
)
= 1⇔ pi (A(∼p)) = 1⇔ ∼p ∈ f(A)⇔ p 6∈ f(A)⇔ pi (A(p)) = 0,
pi
(
{A(p)
)
= 0⇔ pi ({A(p)) 6= 1⇔ pi (A(p)) 6= 0⇔ pi (A(p)) = 1.
pi preserves joins. Let C,C ′ ⊆ N . First, suppose pi(C)∨pi(C ′) = 1. Then
either pi(C) = 1 or pi(C ′) = 1, hence either C ∈ pi−1{1} or C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}.
Therefore, C ∪ C ′ will be the superset of an element of pi−1{1}, hence by
⊇-closedness of pi−1{1}, we obtain C ∪C ′ ∈ pi−1{1}, that is pi (C ∪ C ′) = 1.
Next, suppose pi(C) ∨ pi(C ′) = 0, hence pi(C) = pi(C ′) = 0. We have
already shown that pi preserves complements, therefore we deduce that
pi
(
{C
)
= pi
(
{C ′
)
= 1. Since we have also already seen that pi preserves
meets, we obtain that pi
(
{C ∩ {C ′) = 1 ∧ 1 = 1. Using de Morgan’s law,
pi
(
{(C ∪ C ′)) = 1, hence, again exploiting that pi preserves complements,
we arrive at pi (C ∪ C ′) = 0.
Hence, pi is a homomorphism and the first part of the Theorem
established.
For the converse part of the Theorem, suppose ρ : P(N) → 2 is a
homomorphism. We have to verify that f satisfies axioms (A2-A5). (A2) is
satisfied by assumption. By definition, f satisfies (A3) and (A5).
To prove (A4), note that ρ(∅) = 0 and ρ(N) = 1 since ρ is a
homomorphism,18 and by Remark 9, we can find A,A′ ∈ DN and p, q ∈ X
18For, since ρ preserves algebraic operations, one has (for an arbitrary C ⊆ N)
ρ (∅) = ρ
(
C ∩ {C) = ρ (C) ∧ ρ (C)∗ = 0
and
ρ (N) = ρ
(
C ∪ {C) = ρ (C) ∨ ρ (C)∗ = 1
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such that A(p) = ∅ and A′(q) = N . Then, by construction of f , both
q ∈ f (A′) and p 6∈ f (A), so f (A′) 6= ∅ and f (A) 6= X.
Finally, for every A ∈ DN and p ∈ X, note that A(∼p) = {A(p) by
Equation (1), and therefore, using that ρ is a homomorphism,
p ∈ f(A) ⇔ ρ (A(p)) = 1⇔ ρ ({A(p)) = 0⇔ ρ (A(∼p)) = 0
⇔ ρ (A(∼p)) 6= 1⇔ ∼p 6∈ f(A).
Hence, f(A) is complete and algebraically consistent for every A ∈ DN . 
Proof of Corollary 4. Every shell of a 2-valued homomorphism is
an ultrafilter.19 Therefore, (A2-A5) implies via Theorem 3 that Ff = pi−1{1}
is an ultrafilter on N .
However, every ultrafilter F on a finite set N is principal.20 Hence,
if even (A1-A5) are satisfied, then there must be some if ∈ N such that
pi−1{1} = Ff = {C ⊆ N : if ∈ C}, hence
p ∈ f(A)⇔ pi (A(p)) = 1⇔ A(p) ∈ Ff ⇔ if ∈ A(p)⇔ p ∈ Aif
for all A ∈ Df and p ∈ X. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose f satisfies (A2-A5). Then Ff = pi−1{1}
is non-empty by (A4) and ∩-closed by Lemma 2. Therefore, ∼f must be a
congruence relation.21 For all C ⊆ N , denote by |C| the equivalence class
by the definition of the complement of a Boolean algebra element.
19Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [2, Chapter 1, Lemma 4.7, Theorem 4.9] The proof can be
sketched as follows: Every homomorphism h : P(N)→ B translates ∩ into ∧ and translates
⊆ into ≤. (For, if C ⊆ C′ then C ∩ C′ = C, hence h(C) ∧ h(C′) = h(C ∩ C′) = h(C),
therefore h(C) ≤ h(C′).) It is therefore clear that the shell H of h is ∩-closed and ⊇-
closed. Moreover, as shown in Footnote 18 on page 10, both h(∅) = 0B and h(N) = 1B ,
hence H 6= P(N) and H 6= ∅. Hence, H is a filter. If, in addition, h is 2-valued, then
C ∈ H ⇔ h(C) = 1⇔ h(C)∗ = 0⇔ h ({C) = 0
⇔ h ({C) 6= 1⇔ {C 6∈ H,
so H is even an ultrafilter.
20Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [2, Example 1.3.2 and Exercise 1.3.3] An ultrafilter F is
called principal if and only if there exists some i ∈ N such that F = {C ⊆ N : i ∈ C}. If
N is finite and some ultrafilter F on N were not principal, then {i} 6∈ F and hence N \{i}
for all i ∈ N . Since filters are closed under finite intersections, we get ⋂i∈N N \ {i} ∈ F,
albeit
⋂
i∈N N \ {i} = N \
⋂
i∈N{i} = ∅ by de Morgan’s law, a contradiction.
21Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [2, Chapter 1, proof of Lemma 4.3, proof of Lemma 4.4].
The proof can be summarized as follows: Since Ff is non-empty, ∼f is reflexive. By
definition, ∼f is symmetric. Since Ff is ∩-closed, ∼f is transitive. (For all C,C′, C′′ ⊆ N ,
if there exist U, V ∈ Ff such that C ∩U = C′∩U and C′∩V = C′′∩V , then C ∩U ∩V =
C′′ ∩ U ∩ V whilst U ∩ V ∈ Ff .) Similarly, since Ff is ∩-closed, ∼f respects ∩ and ∪:
For all C0, C1, C′0, C′1 ⊆ N , if there exist U0, U1 ∈ Ff such that C0 ∩ U0 = C′0 ∩ U0 and
C1 ∩ U1 = C′1 ∩ U1, then, by commutativity of ∩,
C0 ∩ C1 ∩ U0 ∩ U1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈Ff
= C′0 ∩ C′1 ∩ U0 ∩ U1
and by distributivity of ∩,∪ also
(C0 ∪ C1) ∩ U0 ∩ U1︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈Ff
=
(
C′0 ∪ C′1
) ∩ U0 ∩ U1.
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of C with respect to ∼f . Since ∼f is a congruence relation, the operations
∧,∨,∗, introduced representative-wise via
|C| ∧ |C ′| := ∣∣C ∩ C ′∣∣ , |C| ∨ |C ′| := ∣∣C ∪ C ′∣∣ , |C|∗ := ∣∣{C∣∣
for all C,C ′ ⊆ N , are well-defined. If we define, in addition,
0∼f := |∅|, 1∼f := |N |
then through straightforward calculations one can check that〈
P(N)/ ∼f ,∧,∨,∗ , 0∼f , 1∼f
〉
is indeed a Boolean algebra. 
Proof of Theorem 6. With the notation of the proof of Lemma 5,
σ : C 7→ |C| trivially preserves the Boolean operations.
Note that for every C ⊆ N , one has
C ∼f N ⇔ ∃U ∈ Ff (C ∩ U = N ∩ U)⇔ ∃U ∈ Ff (C ∩ U = U)
⇔ ∃U ∈ Ff U ⊆ C,
hence, due to the ⊇-closedness of Ff , we obtain
|C| = |N | ⇔ C ∼f N ⇔ C ∈ Ff .
Therefore σ−1 {1∼f} = σ−1 {|N |} = Ff .
For the converse part of the Theorem, the same argument as in the proof
of Theorem 3 shows that f satisfies axioms (A2-A5).
Finally, suppose f were not algebraically consistent. Then there would
be some A ∈ DN and p ∈ X such that both ∼p ∈ f(A) and p ∈ f(A).
Hence τ (A(p)) = f(A)(p) = 1 as well as τ (A(∼p)) = g(A)(∼p) = 1.
However A(∼p) = {A(p) by Equation (1), so τ ({A(p)) = 1. On the other
hand, since τ is a homomorphism and τ (A(p)) = 1, one has τ
(
{A(p)
)
= 0,
contradiction. This proves the algebraic consistency of f . 
Proof of Corollary 7. As the shell of a homomorphism, Ff is a
filter.22
For every filter F on a finite set N , there exists some M ⊆ N such
that F = {C ⊆ N : M ⊆ C}.23 Hence, if (A1-A5) are satisfied, then there
Finally, for all C,C′ ⊆ N , if there exists U ∈ Ff such that C ∩ U = C′ ∩ U , then
U = (U ∩ C) ∪ (U ∩ {C) = (U ∩ C′) ∪ (U ∩ {C),
whence on the one hand
{C′∩U = {C′∩((U ∩ C′) ∪ (U ∩ {C)) = ({C′ ∩ U ∩ C′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∅
∪ ({C′ ∩ U ∩ {C) = {C′∩{C∩U,
and symmetrically (by interchanging the roles of C and C′), one obtains on the other
hand
{C ∩ U = {C ∩ {C′ ∩ U = {C′ ∩ {C ∩ U,
hence {C′ ∩ U = {C ∩ U .
22Cf. e.g. Bell and Slomson [2, Chapter 1, Lemma 4.7]; see Footnote 19 on page 11.
23Filters are closed under finite intersections, hence
⋂
F ∈ F for every filter on a finite
set N . This implies, since filters are closed under supersets, {C ⊆ N : ⋂F ⊆ C} ⊆ F.
Trivially, the converse inclusion also holds. Hence F = {C ⊆ N : ⋂F ⊆ C} for every
filter F on a finite set N .
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must be some Mf ⊆ N such that pi−1{1} = Ff = {C ⊆ N : Mf ⊆ C} =⋂
i∈Mf {C ⊆ N : i ∈ C}, so
p ∈ f(A)⇔ pi (A(p)) = 1⇔ A(p) ∈ Ff ⇔
∀i ∈Mf i ∈ A(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⇔p∈Ai
⇔ p ∈ ⋂
i∈Mf
Ai
for all A ∈ DN and p ∈ X. 
7. Conclusion
Under the assumptions of agenda richness, universality and
systematicity, we have established a correspondence between deductively
closed judgment aggregators and Boolean algebra homomorphisms
on the power-set of the electorate. Moreover, we have shown that
complete judgment aggregators correspond to 2-valued Boolean algebra
homomorphisms on the power-set of the electorate.
As is well-known, Boolean algebra homomorphisms can be partially
characterized through their shells, and (2-valued) homomorphism shells are
the same as (ultra)filters. We have shown that the shell of a homomorphism
induced by a judgment aggregator is just the set of all winning coalitions.
Hence the set of winning coalitions is always a filter — and even an ultrafilter
if the judgment aggregator is complete. This provides an explanation for the
effectiveness of the (ultra)filter method in social choice theory.
From the (ultra)filter property of the set of winning coalitions, one
can easily derive impossibility theorems for judgment aggregators on
finite electorates, even without requiring preservation of unanimity (Pareto
principle): Assuming agenda richness, universality and systematicity, the
oligarchies are the only non-trivial aggregators, and the dictatorships are
the only complete aggregators.
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